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The Role of the Core Security Forces in Economic Growth in South Sudan

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Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms	iv
Executive Summary	vii
1.0 Introduction	1
2.0 The Contextual Security Environment of the South Sudan Economy	2
3.0 Understanding the Security Sector and the Core Security Forces	6
3.1 Defining the Full Extent of the Security Sector	6
3.2 The Extent of the Security Sector within the Context of South Sudan.....	8
3.3 Character, Mission and Mandate of the Forces in Economic Growth.....	10
4.0 The Security-Development Nexus in National Economic Growth	14
5.0 How Do the Core Security Forces Participate in Economic Growth?	18
5.1 The Role of the Military in Selected Countries around the World	18
5.1.1 The Military and Economic Growth in Uganda	18
5.1.2 The Military and Economic Growth in Kenya.....	19
5.1.3 The Military and Economic Growth in India and Egypt	21
5.2 The Core Security Forces and Economic Participation in South Sudan	22
5.2.1 The Case of the Military	22
5.2.2 Overview of the Role of the Other Security Agencies in Economic Growth ..	25
6.0 Recommended Courses of Action on the Way Forward	26
7.0 Conclusion	30
8.0 References and Bibliography	32
9.0 About the Authors	35

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACTJ	African Centre for Transitional Justice
Art.	Article
BA	Bachelor of Arts
CEPO	Community Empowerment for Progress Organisation
CRSV	Conflict Related Sexual Violence
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ERDA	Equatoria Rehabilitation and Development Association
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency (USA)
HS	Human Security
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IPCS	Institute for the Promotion of Civil Society
IPDSS	Institute for Peace, Development and Security Studies, University of Juba
JDB	Joint Defence Board

JMCC	Joint Military Ceasefire Commission
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
MA	Master of Arts
MEC	Military Economic Corporation
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MPF	Military Pension Fund
N/A	Not Available/Availed
NAS	National Salvation Front
NDS	National Development Strategy, 2018
NEC	National Economic Conference
NSS	National Security Services
NTLI	National Transformational Leadership Institute, University of Juba
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Para.	Paragraph
PCCS	Permanent Command Council Secretariat
PERs	Public Expenditure Reviews
PhD	Doctorate of Philosophy

R-ARCSS	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
SDSR	Strategic Defence and Security Review
SPLA	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement
SPLM/A	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army – In Opposition
SSANSA	South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms
SSNDS	South Sudan National Development Strategy, 2018
SSPDF	South Sudan Peoples' Defence Forces
SSUNDE	South Sudanese Network for Democracy and Elections
TCSS, 2011	Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011
TSAAs	Transitional Security Arrangements
UN	United Nations
UPDF	Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces
VSS	Veterans Security Services

Executive Summary

This paper was commissioned by the Ministry of Finance and Planning of the Republic of South Sudan. It was conceived and drawn by the Defence and Security Experts Working Group of the Ebony Center for Strategic Studies. It examines the role of the core security forces—that is, the military—in economic growth in South Sudan.

In seeking to meet this purpose, the paper undertakes a survey of the contextual security environment in South Sudan; delves into an understanding of the meaning and concept of the security sector and the core security forces. In so doing, it looks at the fullest extent of the security sector within the context of South Sudan, focusing on the legal character, mission and mandate of the core security forces as stipulated in the country's constitutional framework. The paper exposes the conferees to the security-development nexus in national economic growth; examines the role of the core security forces in the economic growth of selected countries around the globe; and explores the role of the core security forces in economic growth in South Sudan. It then recommends some topical courses of action on the role of the core security forces in the economic growth of South Sudan.

Owing to the many years of the revolutionary struggle and the unceasing armed conflict since independence in 2011, the security environment in South Sudan is characterised by fragile security institutions. The continuous armed violence between government and rebel forces on the one hand, and between and among belligerent ethnic groups, actively militates against meaningful economic activities. From south to north; and from west to east, South Sudan is laden with perennial economic ills that stem from the proliferation of illegal weapons.

The endless rebellions since independence have meant continuous campaigns by the Government to hold and control territory. The paper underscores that to a greater extent most of the campaigns needed further guidance, as they fell short of an effective counter-insurgency strategy. Of greater significance in this context is the ramification on agriculture, which is not only the backbone of South Sudan's rural economy, but also of the country as a whole. For almost a decade since the civil war erupted in 2013, agricultural production has been rapidly dwindling, owing, in the main, to continuous displacement, dispossession and disillusionment of the rural population, effectively destabilising the very economy of the country's urban centres.

Other than security threats to the economy, there are also fundamental economic threats to security. Despite the great economic potential and the massive oil revenues, personnel of the core security forces have been poorly remunerated since independence. Similarly, non-salary disbursements to the core security forces,

especially to the South Sudan Peoples' Defence Forces, have been utterly insignificant. Consequently, the military has been unable to cater for critical capital expenditure, including acquisition of the equipment that could have allowed it to participate in economic production. Thus, apart from the security threats to the economy, these fundamental economic threats to security and the security sector at large continue to incapacitate the core security forces. Compounding with leadership and accountability issues, struggle for political survival by various actors and mechanisms in the South Sudan polity, and the continuous wars, this led to vulnerability of the economy and state.

Deriving from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the security sector encompasses the core security forces or actors; security management and oversight bodies; justice and law enforcement institutions; non-statutory security forces; and societal groups, such as the academia, policy think-tanks, civil society organisations, and investigative media.

The security sector has a significant relationship with democratisation, development, and good governance, forming the basis of the emphasis for security sector reform. A professional security sector provides security for the state and its people. The security sector has the capacity to support or undermine democratisation, promote or undermine good governance, and contribute to or derail the pursuit of sustainable peace and economic growth.

Security and development are intricately linked that they should not be handled or dealt with separately as if their actions result in different outcomes. There should be a comprehensive approach to development and security, originating from, and hinging itself on, a human security paradigm. South Sudan should construct a security and development policy based on a commitment to protect and promote human security and national economic growth. War reverses development. Violence and the threat of violence are big obstacles in igniting economic growth and development. Since 2013, the civil war has raptured South Sudan's development efforts. Through this first National Economic Conference, there should be emphasis on the urgent need for conceptual, policy and programming innovations that create an intersection between development and security approaches, in order to contribute to sustainable national economic growth.

The core security forces in South Sudan have a legal and moral obligation in promoting and participating in national economic growth, consistent with all the guidelines, limitations and codes of conduct applicable to them. Throughout the world, no country achieved sustainable national economic growth and development at the expense of adequate professional security planning. There is imperative for security planning in every development intervention. Sustainable economic growth is therefore only the outcome of sustainable national security planning, underpinned by the consensus that security is the backbone of the economy.

In its recommendations, the paper suggests the following courses of action on the role of the core security forces in the economic recovery and growth of South Sudan:

- (1) The core security forces, including all non-statutory forces, should partake in reversing the trend of untold human suffering that has befallen South Sudan and its people, as a result of disregarding all fundamental commitments under the constitution and International Law.
- (2) Security should not just be about the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and the safety of the government (*i.e.*, state security), but fundamentally about the people and peoples, in equal measure irrespective of their origin, believe and perceived or actual political affiliation.
- (3) Adoption of appropriate social development measures—rather than concentrating on pure military campaigns—as South Sudan’s counterinsurgency strategy; and rethinking the national counterinsurgency narrative to ensure a better lasting solution to the recurrent rebellions in the country.
- (4) To encourage national development, the core security forces are urged to ensure sustainable peace by improving civil-military relations, ceasing all hostilities and promoting permanent ceasefire to allow voluntary repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation and reintegration of IDPs and refugees. This will rekindle livelihoods and productivity, thereby contributing to South Sudan’s much needed national economic recovery and growth.
- (5) The security management and oversight bodies are urged to adopt and implement strategic security sector reforms, including making related appointments and re-manning of critical units and departments, to ensure that the core security forces fully shoulder their constitutional mandate, contribute to and participate in South Sudan’s economic growth, and partake of their critical moral role as stewards and guardians of development.
- (6) All efforts must be made to accord the necessary security environment for the government, development partners and the private sector to rebuild and recover destroyed physical infrastructure—such as schools, hospitals, shops and places of worship—in order to rekindle/revitalise the livelihoods of the people and contribute to sustainable national economic growth and development.
- (7) To promote sustainable social reforms that guarantee peace and stability, the core security forces are urged to give due consideration to national diversity,

gender and regional representation in their recruitment, training, leadership development, and appointments.

- (8) Military personnel should be enlightened on, and thus always seek to respect, the Law of Armed Conflict, which regulates the use of force. This will contribute to national economic growth, and help South Sudan comply with its obligations under International Law as a member of the United Nations.
- (9) The core security forces and the wider legal system in general are urged to place obligations on persons involved in armed violations that have repercussions on South Sudan's economic growth, development, social status, and moral stature.
- (10) To ensure better security sector reform outcomes that guarantee sustainable national economic growth, it is urged that deployments and appointments within the core security forces ensure that the right people are assigned to the right jobs, and that there is consistency towards promotion of the bigger picture and the common good for South Sudan.
- (11) It is urged that there be improved coordination within internal departments; and between security agencies, to mutually check on and guarantee commitment to standards that promote 'the bigger national picture' and the common good for South Sudan, thereby re-establishing a sense of direction and the strengthening of national cohesion.
- (12) The SSPDF is urged to develop personnel, acquire equipment and establish a unit for Military Operations Other Than War, for responding to requests by the Government in addressing specified emergencies, participating in reconstruction activities, and assisting in disaster relief.
- (13) The Government, through the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, is urged to earmark a specific fund to the military for its engagement in personnel welfare activities and income generating programmes.
- (14) The SSPDF and the other security institutions are urged to undertake a revitalisation of all collapsed and existing investment initiatives, including leadership re-alignment and capacitation where necessary, in order to ensure sustainable participation in economic growth. Given its progress over the years, the security institutions are particularly urged to emulate the "Economic Model of the South Sudan National Security Services," to ensure the growth and sustainability of their investment initiatives and contribute to national development.

- (15) In line with the preceding recommendation, the core security forces are urged to run their investment initiatives or corporations as enterprises based on market principles, rather than as pure military units. They are urged to strengthen the values of transparency and accountability, and strengthen their efforts towards checks-and-balances.
- (16) There should be promotion of diversity based on merit in the management of investment initiatives. Leadership in the enterprises/corporations should encourage participation of employees and the building of a culture teamwork and trust.
- (17) Engaging in partnerships with international investors, particularly in the areas of mining, the hotel and hospitality industry, agriculture, fishing, finance and banking, processing, and infrastructure development.
- (18) Promotion of a culture of goodwill and the common good across all institutions and units of the military/security institutions, characterised by commitment towards human and peoples' rights, and respect for the fundamental freedoms enshrined in South Sudan's constitutional framework.
- (19) Establishment of a military investment authority or body, to offer advice to, monitor and regulate investment initiatives involving the core security forces.
- (20) Comprehensive nation-wide disarmament of civilians, and consolidation of weapons storage and management within the military/security institutions. Implementation of strict measures to control the proliferation of illegal weapons.
- (21) The National Security Services is urged to strengthen and expand its capacities and capabilities for more robust economic and financial intelligence to protect the South Sudan economy from human resource exploitation, counterfeiting, illegal trade, economic exploitation, plunderers, money laundering, and lords of poverty—self-serving individuals and organisations who (Mwesiga Baregu, 2011)¹ perpetuate poverty and thrive on it through aid or donor support.

¹ Mwesiga Baregu. "Actors, Interests and Strategies in the Great Lakes Conflict Formation." In: Mwesiga Baregu, ed. (2011): *Understanding Obstacles to Peace—Actors, Interests and Strategies in Africa's Great Lakes Region*. International Development Research Centre. Ottawa, Canada.

THE ROLE OF THE CORE SECURITY FORCES IN ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SOUTH SUDAN

1.0 Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to critically assess and inform on the role of the core security forces in economic growth in South Sudan. In this endeavour, its fundamental objectives include: critical assessment of the role of South Sudan's contemporary security institutions in economic growth; survey of the contextual security environment of the South Sudan economy; an understanding of the security sector and the core security forces, both within global context and within the specific context of South Sudan; exposure into the criticality of the nexus between security and development in national economic growth; exploration of the role of the core security forces in economic growth in selected countries around the globe, with the view of drawing lessons and parallels for contemporary South Sudan; promote advancement in civil-military relations in the efforts towards national economic growth in South Sudan; and promulgation of context specific courses of action on the way forward for the South Sudan security forces, as well as the institutions and mechanisms falling within the broader umbrella of the economic cluster in South Sudan.

Drawn by the Defence and Security Working Group of the Ebony Center for Strategic Studies, the paper was commissioned by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning of the Republic of South Sudan, with support from the World Bank. It seeks to inform participants of the First National Economic Conference (NEC) of the Republic of South Sudan on the role of core security forces—especially the military—in economic growth, drawing lessons and inspiration from selected countries around the globe. The authors are South Sudanese citizens with long-term experience and expertise in defence and security, who are important players in the ongoing transformation of the South Sudan Peoples' Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the country's other security institutions in general.²

² Primarily based at the Permanent Command Council Secretariat, the SSPDF's research think-tank and publication centre, the authors are also involved in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) Board, the Joint Defence Board (JDB), and the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC), the peace mechanisms responsible for implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Two of the authors—Pierre Atilio-Ekwa (PhD) and Laguya Kenyi Lupai—are also members of the academic staff of the Institute for Peace, Development and Security Studies (IPDSS) at the University of Juba.

The ideas contained herein were mainly drawn using a qualitative research design that encompassed a mixture of data collection methods: interviews, document analysis (or secondary data analysis), and observation.

2.0 The Contextual Security Environment of the South Sudan Economy

A lot of critical security issues define the contemporary operational environment of the South Sudan economy. Central among them is the fundamental challenge of continuous wars that stem from endless rebellions.

The second major critical challenge within the security environment of the South Sudan economy is the rampant and continuous armed inter-communal violence. Several ethnic groups and sections continue to pity each other in continuous cycles of violence, in turn not only causing untold human atrocities, but also obstacles to peace and the economy.

The endless rebellions since independence have meant continuous campaigns by armed opposing forces to hold and control territory. Insurgency groups seek to hold and control territory in order to survive, train and establish safe havens. On the other hand, it is the legitimate right of every state and government to work against rebellion, a process that revolves around the need to hold and control territory. This push by both insurgents and governments for territorial control unfortunately involves violence, which if not carried out on the basis of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) or International Humanitarian Law (IHL) adversely affects the local—usually rural—populations. According to Lorenzo Zambernardi (2010),³ counterinsurgency efforts often involve three main norms of warfare, namely (1) force protection, (2) distinction between enemy combatants and non-combatants, and (3) the physical elimination of insurgents. Counterinsurgency is a complex and multifaceted concept that encompasses a range of strategies, tactics, and approaches aimed at countering and defeating insurrectionary movements. It is a combination of measures designed to suppress, neutralise, and ultimately eliminate the threat posed by insurgents—armed groups or organisations that challenge the authority of a government through unconventional means.⁴

To a greater extent, it appears that most of the campaigns adopted by armed opposing groups in the South Sudan conflict since 2013 were rather misguided, leading to destruction of the rural populations. In certain instances, it appears that

³ Lorenzo Zambernardi (July 2010): “Counterinsurgency’s Impossible Trilemma.” *The Washington Quarterly*. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 33:3 pp. 21-34. DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2010.492722.

⁴ United States Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2009.

even some of the campaigns by the government may have fallen short of an appropriate and effective counterinsurgency strategy. Of greater significance and mention in this specific context is the ramification on agriculture, which is not only the backbone of South Sudan's rural economy, but also of the country as a whole. The difficulty in ensuring compliance with the norms of warfare in such circumstances constitutes the basis of what Zambarnardi (2010) refers to as *the Impossible Trilemma of Counterinsurgency*. For almost a decade since the war broke out in 2013, agricultural production has been rapidly dwindling, owing, in the main, to disregard for civil-military relations, resulting into continuous displacement, dispossession and disillusionment of the rural population, effectively destroying not only the rural economy itself, but also the urban and indeed national economy of South Sudan.

Designing and adopting a new counterinsurgency strategy is imperative to the honest quest for sustainable peace in the country. This paper places emphasis on and thus urges the adoption of social development as a counterinsurgency measure. The Copenhagen Social Summit 1995 defined social development in a three-fold conceptualisation of critical aspects that include poverty eradication, employment generation, and social harmony. Pathak (1989) advises that social development must result into a fundamental change in society, in terms of the political, economic and cultural aspects, introduced as part of deliberate action to transform society.⁵ To Indra Pandey (1981), it must necessarily lead to the realisation of the human potential, the fulfilment of human needs, and the general improvement of the quality of life of the people through equitable distribution of resources, broad-based participation in the process of decision-making and enabling marginal groups and communities to move into the mainstream.⁶

Rethinking South Sudan's counterinsurgency strategy is critical because "poverty has been a main cause of [and motivation for] violence and insecurities among the youths and unknown gunmen in the country."⁷ Florian Stolpe (2014)⁸ employed the Greed versus Grievance Theory developed by Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009)⁹ in explaining the rebellion in South Sudan. According to Stolpe (2014:14), "the

⁵ Pathak, S. (1987). "Social Development". *Encyclopedia of Social Work in India*. (Vol.11).

⁶ Indra M. Pandey (1981). *Working Capital trends in India*. Indian Institute of Management, New Delhi, India.

⁷ Major General Deng Solomon Leek, Director General for South Sudan Military Economic Production, in a formal presentation by the Military Economic Corporation to the 8th Command Council Conference of the SSPDF. December 2022. The Eagle House, Bilpam, Juba.

⁸ Florian Stolpe (2014): *Beyond Greed and Grievance in South Sudan: Analysis of Ethnically and Politically Motivated Violence*. BA Thesis, Political Sciences and Law. Institute of Political Sciences. Westphalian Wilhelms-University Münster.

⁹ Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Rohner, D. (2009): Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers*. 61(1). Pp.1-27.

opportunities for the onset of civil war were favourable and economic motivation was sufficient” for the war in South Sudan. Citing the benchmarks pointed out by Collier et al, she identifies several issues as conditions that were favourable for the rebellion in the country, among them: “high dependency on natural resources, low economic growth, low income, short peace duration, low population, and high social fractionalisation.” Among the conditions, she argues that the “faction engaging in armed rebellion against the government must have seen favourable situation,” and that there “must have been a perceived window of vulnerability of the government, or a lack of deterring factors.” In their hypothesis, the “justice-seeking motivations of the rebelling group[s] to engage in rebellion were sufficient,” forming a “specific set of grievances and inequalities” that were “used to mobilise identity groups.”

Other similarly serious factors include the presence, proliferation and trafficking of illegal weapons; ambushes and attacks against vehicular convoys carrying transit goods and services along highways throughout the country; organized armed criminal cartels,¹⁰ especially in urban centres; and a hitherto fragile security institutional framework. These critical security issues reproduce continuous population displacement, dispossession and disillusionment across the length and breadth of the country, sending millions as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees.

As a result of the ongoing violence, businesses have been and are frequently targeted, looted, destroyed and scattered. During violence, many shops and market centres get burnt. Many people—the worst affected among them women—have not only lost their means of generating incomes, but also their livelihoods.

Apart from the above, the other critical security dimension against the South Sudan economy is the deliberate destruction of critical economic and social infrastructure by opposing forces during moments of violence. This is a severe factor that continues to militate against economic recovery and growth even after the formal cessation of hostilities.

Racketeering, extortion and uncontrolled dollar repatriation collectively constitutes yet another major security impediment to the growth and viability of the South Sudan economy. This challenge is closely related to, and thus thrives on, limitations in security management of aliens and related outward financial transfers. Money laundering, done through or involving regional and international financial institutions¹¹ and insurance companies, is very common. Together with the vastly unregulated trade, these security challenges militate against the expected growth and viability of the South Sudan economy.

¹⁰ Such as the so-called “Toronto Boys,” “California Boys,” and “Niggas” in Juba.

¹¹ Such as foreign exchange bureaus and international cash transfer companies.

Owing to the revolutionary background of the current security sector, South Sudan is yet to make significant strides in acquiring and sustaining the human, material and technological capabilities needed for effective economic and financial intelligence that would regulate, guard against and promote sustainable national economic growth and viability. Thus, the current environment is defined by struggling institutional capacity for financial and economic intelligence. A related security challenge to this is said to stem from inadequacies, in certain instances, in regulating some trade and trade networks involving military personnel who choose not to comply with applicable regulation. This is more difficult in cases where they are involved in illegal trade and financial activities.

The territory that now comprises independent South Sudan has been in consistent warfare for decades. During this time, millions of weapons and other military paraphernalia were brought in by the different actors and participants that constituted the warring parties. Unfortunately, no sustainable comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes were conceived and implemented, both before and after the country's independence. A lot of these weapons, many of which are now in the hands of civilians and negative elements, are frequently used for perpetrating untold violence. From south to north; and from west to east, South Sudan is laden with perennial economic ills that stem from the proliferation, use and abuse of illegal weapons.

Other than these security threats to the economy, there are also fundamental economic threats to security. Despite the great economic potential and the massive oil revenues, personnel of the core security forces have been poorly remunerated since independence. Similarly, non-salary disbursements to the core security forces, especially to the SSPDF, have been utterly insignificant. Consequently, the military has been unable to cater for critical capital expenditure, including acquisition of the equipment that could have allowed it to participate in economic production.

Thus, apart from the security threats to the economy, these fundamental economic threats to security and the security sector at large continue to incapacitate the core security forces. Compounding with leadership and accountability issues, struggle for political survival by various actors and mechanisms in the South Sudan polity, and the continuous wars, the South Sudan economy has been rendered vulnerable.

Basing on the above, it can be concluded that unless rectified, the contemporary contextual security environment of the South Sudan economy is fundamentally unstable, fragile, petrifying to investment, and derails, rather than contributes to, the pursuit of sustainable development and national economic growth.

3.0 Understanding the Security Sector and the Core Security Forces

3.1 Defining the Full Extent of the Security Sector

According to Laguya Joseph Samuelson (2016:27), *security* may be understood as “the maintenance or existence of law and order, the absence of or freedom from danger, or a state of peace and harmony that derives from protection from danger.” He refers to the *security sector* as “that arena of public life that concerns itself with the provision and maintenance of law and order in society” and as “that arena of the public establishment that ensures and dedicates itself to the protection of people and their property from danger” (Samuelson, 2016:27).¹²

Aries A. Arugay (2007) says that the security sector may be understood and defined in both *minimalist* and *maximalist* perspectives.¹³ He clarifies that the minimalist or *traditionalist* perspective only identifies and focuses on the *core security forces*. These forces that constitute the security sector in the minimalist or traditionalist perspective include the military, the police, and paramilitary forces; all of which are only concerned with the provision of public security, involving only all actors and agencies authorised to threaten or to use violence in the protection of the state, its citizens or its external environment (Heiner Hänggi, 2003; in Samuelson, 2016). Thus, on the basis of the minimalist perspective, the following institutions comprise the security sector in South Sudan: the SSPDF, the South Sudan National Police Service, the National Security Services, the Prisons Service, the Wildlife Service, and the Civil Defence Service.

However, contrary to the traditionalist definition, the maximalist perspective brings on-board almost all institutions and groups in the government and civil society. Indeed as defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the security sector broadly includes at least five categories.¹⁴

The *first* encompasses *core security forces or actors*; which include the armed forces, paramilitary forces, intelligence services, police, gendarmeries, presidential guards, reserve or local security units, militias, and border and customs personnel. The *second* is that of *security management and oversight bodies*. It includes executive departments, national security advisory bodies, parliamentary or congressional committees,

¹² Laguya Joseph Samuelson (2016): *Ethnicity and Security Sector Reform in South Sudan*. Thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Security and Strategic Studies. Centre for Peace and Development Studies, University of Juba. Juba, South Sudan.


¹³ Aries A. Arugay (2007): *Civil Society's Next Frontier: Security Sector Reform (SSR) Advocacy in the Philippines*. Paper presented at the 5th ISTR Asia-Pacific Conference, Manila, the Philippines.

¹⁴ *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, 2007*. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Development Assistance Committee. Paris, France.

ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs, customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies, human rights institutions, and civil society organisations and public compliant commissions.

The *third* inculcates *justice and law enforcement institutions*, such as the judiciary, ministries of justice, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, customary and traditional justice system, human rights commissions and ombudsmen.¹⁵ The *fourth* brings on-board *non-statutory security forces*, like liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private body-guard units, private security companies, and political party militias. The *fifth* relates to *societal groups* such as the academia, policy think-tanks, peace and human rights movements, and investigative media.

Figure 1. The Security Sector – Maximalist Perspective



¹⁵ Or, Inspectors General of Government.

3.2 The Extent of the Security Sector within the Context of South Sudan

Deducing from the maximalist perspective, the institutions that comprise the security sector within the specific contemporary context of South Sudan are as shown in *Table 1* below.

Table 1: Institutions Comprising the Security Sector in South Sudan, 2023

Security Sector Category	South Sudan Institutional Examples
Core Security Forces or Actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • South Sudan Peoples' Defence Forces • National Police Service • National Security Services • Prisons Services • Wildlife Service • Civil Defence Service
Security Management & Oversight Bodies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The National Legislative Assembly • The Presidency • The National Security Council • The National Defence Council • The SSPDF Command Council • The South Sudan Human Rights Commission • National Ministries: Defence, National Security, Interior, and Wildlife Conservation
Justice and Law Enforcement Institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • South Sudan's departments charged with the responsibility of inspecting and ensuring the smooth work and function of government. • The courts of judicature under the country's legal system
Non-Statutory Security Forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Private security companies, e.g. Insight Security (formerly Warrior Security), Veterans Security Service (VSS), Achieng Security, etc. • Guerrilla armies (rebel groups): e.g., National Salvation Front (NAS), SPLM/A-IO, etc. • Private militias: e.g., Arrow Boys, Nyarangwa, Gelweng, etc.
Societal Groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Civil Society, represented by civil society groups, e.g., Community Empowerment for Progress Organisation (CEPO), African Centre for Transitional Justice (ACTJ), etc.¹⁶ • Independent research think-tanks, e.g., the Sudd Institute, the Ebony Center for Strategic Studies. • The Academia, represented by schools, colleges, institutes and universities in the country, including, most notably, the IPDSS¹⁷ and the NTLI¹⁸ of the University of Juba.

Source: Laguya Kenyi Lupai (upcoming): Juba Manual on Ethnicity and Security Sector Reform

¹⁶ Further examples include: the Equatoria Rehabilitation & Development Association (ERDA), the Institute for the Promotion of Civil Society (IPCS), the South Sudanese Network for Democracy and Elections (SSUNDE), South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), etc.

¹⁷ Institute for Peace, Development and Security Studies.

¹⁸ National Transformational Leadership Institute.

As shown in *Table 1* above, the security sector is a broad subdivision that goes far beyond the core security forces identified in the first column. As per conventional national inter-governmental practice and linkages, *Table 1* implies that the functionality of the core security forces is directly influenced by the ability—including actions and inactions—of all the other components of the security sector. This criticality of the nexus of interaction militates upon the ability of the core security forces—including the military—in performing to national and conventional professional expectations in a situation where the other components are not doing their best in furthering the objectives and wellbeing of the sector. This deduces the understanding that professional setbacks within the core security forces globally are most often an indication of gross inconsistencies among a country’s security management and oversight bodies, and in its justice and law enforcement institutions; characterised by lack of attention to—and/or lapses among societal groups such as CSOs and the academia, in articulating and being watchful of prevailing national security issues, “impacting on the socio-economic welling, economic development, governance, human rights and rule of law”¹⁹ among citizens.

Figure 2. The Security Sector Gear: Functionality of the Fundamental Components



The functionality (movability) of the Core Security Forces illustrated above is entirely dependent upon the proper functionality (movability) of the ‘motor’ of the Security Management and Oversight Bodies. Here, the Security Management and Oversight Bodies are responsible for the (im)movability (i.e., actions and inactions) of the entire sector.

¹⁹ Concept Paper, National Security Policy and Strategy (NSPS) of the Republic of South Sudan, 2012.

3.3 Character, Mission and Mandate of the Forces in Economic Growth

The legal character, mission and mandate (*i.e.*, legal framework) of the core security forces of the country are spelled out in the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 (or “the TCSS, 2011”).

While there are similarities in the stipulation of the character, mission and mandate, the TCSS (2011) draws special and specific mandate to each of the six core security forces in South Sudan. Across all, it emphasises on non-partisanship, adoption of national character by way of the peoples’ diversity, patriotism, professionalism, discipline, productivity (by which is meant economic growth or productivity), respect for democracy and democratic norms, protection of the people and properties of South Sudan, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and subordination to civilian authority. This implies that to exhibit a better character and shoulder their mission and mandate, the security forces must always have good civil-military relations. The summary of the similarities and differences is illustrated in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Legal Mandate of South Sudan’s Core Security Forces in view of Economic Growth

S/No	Security Institution	Legal Character, Mission and Mandate	Instituting Article(s)
I.	The South Sudan Peoples’ Defence Forces (SSPDF) ²⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, regular, professional, disciplined, productive and subordinate to the civilian authority. • The mission of the SSPDF, in addition to its other national duties, include involvement in addressing any emergencies, participation in reconstruction activities, and assistance in disaster management and relief. • Engagement of the armed forces in missions of non-military nature. • Respect and abide by the rule of law, respect the will of the people, the civilian authority, democracy, basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Art. 151, para (2), TCSS, 2011. • Art. 151, para (4) (f), TCSS, 2011. • Art. 151, para (5), TCSS, 2011. • Art. 151, para (6), TCSS, 2011.

²⁰ Originally, the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011, uses the names “Sudan People’s Liberation Army” and “South Sudan Armed Forces.” In addition, it sometimes also uses the descriptive form “the national armed forces” in a manner non-indicative of a proper noun. The name “South Sudan Peoples’ Defence Forces” (or “SSPDF” in abbreviation) was adopted several years after the publication of the said constitution, replacing the said earlier names and description(s).

S/No	Security Institution	Legal Character, Mission and Mandate	Instituting Article(s)
2.	The National Police Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mission is to prevent, combat and investigate crime, maintain law and public order, protect the people and their properties. • Governed by the Constitution and the law, respect the will of the people, the rule of law and order, civilian authority, democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and execute judicial orders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Art. 155, para (2) (a), TCSS, 2011. • Art. 155, para (6), TCSS, 2011.
3.	The National Prisons Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mission fundamentally involves being a correctional, reformative and rehabilitative service. Respect the will of the people, the rule of law and order, civilian authority, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Art. 156, para (2), TCSS, 2011.
4.	The Wildlife Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mission involves protecting the wildlife, as well as preserving and conserving the natural habitat of flora and fauna. • Conservation and protection of the natural ecosystems, bio-diversity and endangered species. • Management of wildlife resources in a way that ensures protection of human life. • Management of wildlife in accordance with international standards and obligations. • Respect the will of the people, the rule of law, civilian authority, democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and protection of animals consistent with the law. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Art. 157, para (2), TCSS, 2011. • Art. 157, para (7) (a), TCSS, 2011. • Art. 157, para (7) (b), TCSS, 2011. • Art. 157, para (7) (c), TCSS, 2011. • Art. 157, para (8), TCSS, 2011.
5.	The National Civil Defence Service ²¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mission involves preventing and protecting the people and their property from fire and disasters. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Art. 158, para (2), TCSS, 2011.
6.	The National Security Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Charged with the internal and external security of South Sudan and its people. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Art. 160, para (4), TCSS, 2011. • Art. 159, (b)-(e), TCSS, 2011.

²¹ The TCSS, 2011, uses the service's previous name, "the Fire Brigade Service."

S/No	Security Institution	Legal Character, Mission and Mandate	Instituting Article(s)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Subordinate to civilian authority; respect the will of the people, the rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms; reflect the diversity of the people; show professionalism, mandate focuses on information gathering, analysis and provision of advice to the relevant authorities. 	

Source: Table conceived and drawn on the basis of Part Ten of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011.

As seen in the articulation of the TCSS (2011), the legal character, mission and mandate of the core security forces seek to foster an enabling environment for viable and sustainable economic growth in the country. This is the reason as to why issues to do with peace, security and the rule of law in the efforts to stabilise the economy constitute a fundamental aspect of the National Development Strategy (NDS) of South Sudan. The NDS was drawn in view of the “context of conflict, humanitarian crisis and economic downturn” and at a time when “several processes were ongoing, all geared towards placing South Sudan back on the path to development.”²²

In seeking to place the country back on the path to economic growth and development, the NDS establishes four guiding principles to which the role of the core security forces is critical. The first principle concerns the building and consolidation of “peace, security and rule of law.” The second is dedicated to “democracy and good governance,” the third on “socio-economic development” and the fourth on building and consolidating “international compacts and partnerships.” These guiding principles seek to ensure “justice, liberty and prosperity” as part of South Sudan’s Vision 2040,²³ with the stated mission to “silence the guns and improve the living conditions of South Sudanese,” all through the stated overall objective of seeking to “consolidate peace and stabilise the economy” (SSNDS, 2018:8-9).

In the articulation of the NDS, the Government of South Sudan should invest in areas that will consolidate peace and stabilise the economy; and mentions some of these areas as being “agriculture and livestock, petroleum, security sector reform, and basic services” (SSNDS, 2018:4). In accordance with the TCSS (2011), the security forces, spearheaded by the SSPDF, play a pivotal role in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), both during peace time and in moments of conflict.

²² South Sudan National Development Strategy, 2018 Version.

²³ According to the Ministry of Finance and Planning, South Sudan’s Vision 2040 was inspired by the Africa Agenda 2063; specifically the aspect on “a peaceful and secure Africa.”

In addition, global conventions²⁴ urge for the use of military and civil defence assets in responding to emergencies and disasters (both natural and manmade), such as floods, draughts, epidemics, pandemics and bushfires, among others. The threat posed by emergencies and disasters necessitates and rationalizes the core security forces, and especially the SSPDF, to take lead and command in complimenting relevant government departments in arresting situations through awareness campaigns and rapid response measures deemed necessary and within the reach of existing capabilities. These roles are constitutionally mandated and allow the military to participate and aid civilian efforts in times of national emergencies and disasters.

Unlike many countries around the globe and in the Horn of Africa and East Africa regions, South Sudan faces more dire challenges other than the outbreak of emergencies and disasters. It is left in ruins and vulnerable to food and human insecurities resulting from the continuous armed violence and resultant economic meltdown. Against this backdrop, the constitutional mandate requires the core security forces to play a central role not only in the maintenance of law, order and security, but also to exercise adequate preparedness in the eventuality of emergencies and disasters, which demand intervention under the dimension of MOOTW.

During armed conflict, individual soldiers, regardless of their rank, are under obligation to comply with the LOAC;²⁵ must ensure that the same is complied with by others, and that necessary responsible actions—including trial by a duly constituted court martial—are taken in event of violations. In this endeavour, commanders have a responsibility and duty to shoulder, ensuring that personnel under their command receive training in the rules of the LOAC. It must be conditioned upon commanders to always give lawful and unambiguous orders; and that their orders are lawfully carried out by their subordinates. This way, the core security forces would always be able to reduce as much as possible the suffering, loss and damage caused by war.

Reduction in suffering, loss and damage caused by war improves the public image of South Sudan, which in turn garners increased international recognition, support and partnerships for reconstruction, investment, economic growth and development. For this reason, placing obligations on persons involved in armed violations that have repercussions on the economy adds impetus to South Sudan's development trajectory. The importance of placing obligation or accountability on

²⁴ Such as the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, March 2003, as revised, 2007.

²⁵ Also known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

perpetrators of crimes is perhaps better articulated by James Bryce (1921),²⁶ whose words in the context of contemporary South Sudan are even more inspiring:

There is no better test of excellence of a government than the efficiency of its judicial system, for nothing more nearly touches the welfare and security of the average citizen than his sense that he can rely on the certain and prompt administration of justice. Law is respected and supported when it is treated as the shield of innocence and the impartial guardian of every private civil right ... if the law be dishonestly administered, the salt has lost its flavour, if it be weakly or fitfully coerced, the guarantees of order fail ... if the lamp of justice goes out in darkness, how great is the darkness.

4.0 The Security-Development Nexus in National Economic Growth

The emphasis by the NEC and indeed the Government of South Sudan on the critical role of the core security forces in economic growth and development is in concurrence with ongoing concern and debate, both regionally and globally, in both developing and developed countries.

This focus—in the argument of Arugay (2007)—is because the security sector has a significant relationship with democratisation, development, and good governance. This is the basis of the emphasis by communities, local civil society groups, regional and international inter-governmental organisations, and the wider international community for security sector reform (Samuelson, 2016). The security sector plays a vital role in the provision of the security of the state and its people. In the developing world, it is an important actor because of its capacity to support or undermine democratisation, promote or undermine good governance, and contribute to or derail the pursuit of sustainable peace (Arugay, 2007).

In the arguments of Medhane Tadesse (2010), human security in all its aspects has proved more elusive in Africa, where some of the longest-running wars are being fought, making basic security to become intangible for individuals and nations alike. Sadly, South Sudan—both before and after independence in July 2011—has been a participant in the armed conflicts that Tadesse refers to.

The Security-Development Nexus is a concept which emerged in the 1990s, with the primary objective of linking development planning to security planning. It believes security and development are intricately linked that they cannot be handled or dealt with separately as if their actions result in different outcomes. Before the emergence of this new idea, development and security were historically regarded in both discourse and policy as separate concepts.

²⁶ James Bryce (1921): *Modern Democracies*, Macmillan Publishers, London, United Kingdom; as quoted in JC Johari (2012): *Contemporary Political Theory: New Dimensions, Basic Concepts and Major Trends*, Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, India

The security-development nexus emerged as a call by scholars for a comprehensive approach to development and security, originating from, and hinging itself on, a human security paradigm. Thus, its objective is for states to construct a security and development policy based on a commitment to protect and promote human security. The concept believes that war is development in reverse, and that violence and the threat of violence within and between communities are big obstacles in igniting economic growth and development.

Most conflicts in the world today are civil wars with far-reaching regional and international dimensions and ramifications. The security-development nexus believes that these wars originate because of gross failure in a country's development efforts. It believes a civil war raptures a country's development efforts, and therefore emphasises the need for conceptual, policy and programming innovations at the intersection of development and security. It calls for adoption of appropriate strategies for responding to the complex socio-economic, political, environmental and security challenges in conflict-prone, conflict-torn, and post-conflict countries. In designing and implementing such strategies, the security-development nexus identifies and regards three sectors as critically essential for building sustainable peace: governance, security, and rule of law. This argument corresponds—and is in line—with those echoed earlier in the “Extent of the Security Sector within the Context of South Sudan” (in Section 3.2), as well as with the illustration provided therein under Figure 2.


Thus, basing on conventional military practice (albeit defence and security practice), the TCSS (2011), and the security-development nexus, the core security forces have a legal and moral obligation in promoting and participating in national economic growth, consistent with all the guidelines, limitations and codes of conduct applicable to them.

In both conceptual understanding and contemporary conventional practice, no country has achieved sustainable national economic growth and development at the expense of adequate professional security planning. There is an imperative for security planning in every development intervention undertaken by a country. Thus, sustainable economic growth is only the outcome of sustainable national security planning, underpinned by the consensus that security is the backbone of the economy.

To foster sustainable development, national economic growth must necessarily be conceived, planned and implemented in a holistic way that guarantees security for people's human rights and fundamental freedoms. Government planning must ensure not only state security, but also national security and human security, the latter of which—above all else—must necessarily constitute the intersection or meeting point between development and security interventions.


The nexus between development and security is a critical one, which is yet to be understood by many countries around the globe. It is the submission of the authors of this paper that South Sudan must understand, embrace and address the criticality of this nexus, if it must start to realise tangible and sustainable outcomes in its uncertain development efforts, which have for long been laden with formidable security challenges. It is premised upon the convictions of the security-development nexus that the R-ARCSS (2018:1) urges the people and Government to be “mindful of our commitment under the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan... to lay the foundation for a united, peaceful and prosperous society based on justice, equality, respect for human rights and the rule of law.”

Figure 3: The Security-Development Nexus, Illustration 1




Source: Unattributed

Figure 4: The Security-Development Nexus, Illustration 2



Source: Middlebrook & Miller (2006) – Adapted from World Bank (2005)

Figure 5: The Security-Development Nexus, Illustration 3



Source: Source: Unattributed. HS stands for Human Security

5.0 How Do the Core Security Forces Participate in Economic Growth?

5.1 The Role of the Military in Selected Countries around the World

5.1.1 The Military and Economic Growth in Uganda

Over the years since its founding, the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF) has nurtured into "a nonpartisan force, national in character, patriotic, professional, disciplined, productive and subordinate to... civilian authority" consistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. It states that its interest is to protect Uganda and Africa at large, by providing a safe and secure environment in which all Ugandan citizens can live and prosper economically. In seeking this interest, the UPDF states that its functions, among others, are: "to co-operate with civilian authority in emergency situations in cases of natural disasters;" "to foster harmony and understanding between the defence forces and civilians;" and "to engage in productive activities for the development of Uganda" (the UPDF, 2023).²⁷

To this effect, its objectives include the creation of a productive and self-sustaining force; adherence to and furtherance of international obligations; the respect for human rights; creation of regional alliances in enhancing regional security and stability; fostering and maintaining national cohesion; promotion of political, economic, social and cultural cooperation within the East Africa Community (EAC); and support regional and continental integration through the EAC and the African Union (AU). In ensuring Uganda's national economic and political interests, the UPDF contributes to regional stability by collaborating with other regional forces to maintain stability and prevent insecurity from spilling over onto Ugandan soil.²⁸

To be able to promote national stability and economic growth, the UPDF institutional framework dedicates special priority to the welfare of its personnel and that of their families. It achieves this by ensuring financial and physical welfare, as well as psycho-social rehabilitation and support to combatants who got disability whilst in the service of Uganda.²⁹ Beyond these core values and principles, the UPDF contributes to Uganda's national economic growth by participating in disaster mitigation, conceptualisation and construction of infrastructure,³⁰ engaging in

²⁷ The Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces. <https://www.updf.go.ug/who-we-are/>. As accessed on 28 August 2023; at approximately 0900 hours.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Huda Abason Oleru, Ugandan Minister of State for Defence in charge of Veteran Affairs, at a speech during the launch of UPDF's 42nd Tarehe Sita (military) Anniversary.

“landmark offensive against environmental insecurity” by assuming “a vanguard role in massive tree planting and mitigating environmental degradation.”³¹

Furthermore, the Ugandan defence and security sector has established several capital intensive high-income industries, manufacturing both civilian commodities and defence-related products. With most of the country being a fertile and arable land, agriculture constitutes an important area for economic engagement by the Ugandan military. The sale of produce and industrial outputs generates and injects massive revenues into the Ugandan economy, while the industries and farms create enormous employment opportunities for young Ugandans, who in turn improve their standards of living and alleviate poverty.

The Ugandan military believes that the country’s economic production and contribution to globalisation is based upon the prospects for promoting human development and political stability; both of which it believes are closely linked to the state of the Ugandan economy.³² In this context, it believes that “the level of social cohesion in Uganda is closely related to [the] levels of human development.” Most importantly, the Uganda military believes that “the population plays a dual role as a factor of production and as a market for consumer goods,” believing in these as “pre-requisites for the attainment of high levels of social and economic advancement as... enjoyed by the developed countries.”³³ These fundamental institutional perceptions and critical doctrinal mind-set have guided and continue to guide the Ugandan military in its support and contribution to sustainable national economic growth in Uganda.

5.1.2 The Military and Economic Growth in Kenya³⁴

Like professional defence institutions around the world, the Kenyan military is primarily responsible for the defence of the country against external aggression and for the security of the regime. The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) is composed of

³¹ General Wilson Mbasu Mbadi, Uganda Chief of the Defence Forces, in a speech delivered on his behalf by Maj Gen Sam Kavuma at the launch of UPDF’s 42nd Tarehe Sita Anniversary.

³² JO Ochan, DD Duur et al. (2007): “Internal Security and Aid to Civil Power in Uganda.” November 2007. Presentation by Sub-Syndicate Group B. The Uganda Senior Command and Staff College, Kimaka, Jinja.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Obtained from multiple sources, but majorly Francis Muriithi Kibicho (2005): *The Role of the Military in National Development: A Case Study of Kenya*. A research project submitted to the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies in partial fulfilment for the requirement of the degree of Master of Arts in International Studies, University of Nairobi. [This student undertook the said course at the National Defence College in Karen].

three arms, namely the Kenya Army, the Kenya Navy and the Kenya Air Force. All these institutions have both peace-time and wartime roles.

To foster development and economic growth, the Kenya Navy is bestowed with the responsibility of defending the overall maritime interests of the country, including control of national territorial waters along the Indian Ocean and Lake Victoria, and surveillance and protection of Kenya's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) against illegal exploration and exploitation. Via this function, it is also responsible for the prevention of illegal trade networks involved in smuggling, drug trafficking, and illegal fishing, and is involved in search and rescue missions.

Kenya's grand strategy places a special focus on security, and has therefore securitised poverty eradication to the extent that all efforts must be geared towards wealth creation to guarantee the country's survival as a state. As a result, the military has been professionalised and transformed to detect, pre-empt and diffuse security threats to the economy and national development.

Defence and military personnel are developed with the understanding that the main threat to the survival of Kenya as a state is the level of poverty in the country, worsened by imbalances in the distribution of the nation's wealth among the population. Thus, Kenya exudes a constant urge towards attaining and sustaining national security through harmonisation of economic strength, political leadership and military strength. It engages in constant efforts towards sustaining a conducive environment for economic activities, national stability, and the fostering of economic investment by both citizens and foreigners. In turn, these contribute to poverty alleviation and national economic development.

The KDF is engaged in emergency and disaster response, civil construction works, water purification and supply, flood control, surgical and medical treatment, casualty evacuation, medical evacuation, search and rescue, pest control, fire fighting, and airlift of relief supplies. To meet these defence and economic roles, the capacity of the Kenyan military has been developed to support economic development through heavy duty sea lifts, and patrol and surveillance of the EEZ using offshore patrol vessels.

The KDF is also engaged in efforts aimed at regional stability and economic growth through peacekeeping missions. Both nationally and regionally, the Kenyan military sees support to democratisation and democracy as essential aspects of Kenya's contribution to sustainable economic growth and development.

5.1.3 The Military and Economic Growth in India and Egypt³⁵

The role of the military in national economic growth and development in India and the Arab Republic of Egypt is shown in Table 5 below.

Table 3: The Role of the Indian and Egyptian Militaries in National Development and Economic Growth

Country Military	Manner of Economic Participation
India	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary role of the military is defence of the country against external threats; • Secondary role is aid to civil authority; • Military evenly spread throughout the country; fostering quick response to incidents of disaster; • Specialised teams to cater for after-effects of disaster; • The force is well resourced, and is therefore not constrained by personnel, finance or equipment; • Military is highly advanced in Information Technology; hence it is heavily involved in India’s national Information Technology programme; • Has sustainable welfare and relief programmes, done through women associations; • Manufacture of defence products for global sales, periodically showcased in defence exhibitions; and • The force has intensive high-calibre mobile hospitals.
Egypt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary role is defence of the country against external aggression; • Secondary role involves aid to civil authority in maintenance of law and order; • Military evenly spread throughout the country, facilitating quick response to incidents of disaster; • The force is well resourced and trained, and is therefore not constrained by manpower and financial resources; • Has a well-established welfare programme for its personnel; • Has well-established welfare and relief programmes in support of the civil population in times of emergency; • Manufacture of defence products for global sales, periodically showcased in defence exhibitions; • The Army Engineers have dedicated departments dealing solely in civil economic projects; • The military receives contracts from the government, particularly large projects requiring quick action; and receives payment for such contracts; • The cost of projects offered by the military is often lower than those charged for the same by civil contractors;

³⁵ Ibid (fn 34).

Country Military	Manner of Economic Participation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Army Signals corps has a dedicated department that solely deals with civil projects whose nature relates to communications, and whose execution requires urgent action; • Depending on prevailing situations, the Engineers and Signals corps can carry out some government projects free of charge; • The Army has separate logistics units dedicated for commercial activities, e.g., operation of supermarkets, and crop and livestock farming; • Proceeds from commercial activities go to the Egyptian Armed Forces, but not the national revenue pool; • Operates military industries specialised in the manufacture of both military and civil products; • The military manufactures its own uniforms, weapons, vehicles and other equipment; • Involvement in crisis prevention and management; • The military is heavily involved in research and development projects in collaboration with other institutions—government departments, research think-tanks, colleges and universities; and • Civilians are served at military hospitals at subsidized prices, and free of charge in times of crisis.

Source: the author(s), based on information obtained from Kibicho, 2005.

5.2 The Core Security Forces and Economic Participation in South Sudan

5.2.1 The Case of the Military

The SPLA Act 2009 mandates the SSPDF (previously SPLA) “to participate in reconstruction activities in South Sudan.” On this basis, the SSPDF established a body known as the Military Economic Corporation (MEC), to act as the South Sudan military’s legal institutional framework for engaging in economic and reconstruction activities. The South Sudan Council of Ministers³⁶ mandated MEC to carryout investment activities on behalf of the SSPDF. It envisions economic strength and financial sustainability for the wellbeing of the SSPDF, with the stated mission of generating revenues through production and services, by competitive advantage in the domestic, regional and international markets.

Core among its objectives are the generation of funds through various projects to support the SSPDF, production of food for the military to minimize dependence on the national budgetary allocation, promotion of industrial technology for the development of the SSPDF, encouragement of self-reliance and job creation opportunities for wounded heroes, and improvement of the welfare of SSPDF personnel through equitable service provision. MEC seeks to operate as an

³⁶ Via Council of Minister’s Resolution No. 79/2019

investment and trading arm of the defence sector by striving to serve as a national provider of multiple services, thereby contributing towards sustainable national economic growth and development while improving the quality of life of military personnel and veterans.

5.2.1.1 Current and Planned Investment Initiatives

There are several ongoing economic initiatives established by MEC. A selection of these are summarised in *Table 4* below. In addition, some planned initiatives are currently underway. A selection of the same are summarised in *Table 5*.

Table 4: A Selection of Current Economic Investment Initiatives by MEC, SSPDF

S/No	Initiative/Investment Scope	Areas Covered	Status
1.	Agriculture/farming	Selected locations countrywide	Operational
2.	Public transport services, mainly via Bongo Bus	Mainly Juba, Nimule, Bor, Terekeka	Operational
3.	River transport services, mainly Shoebill barges	Along the Nile in Bor, Malakal, Renk	Operational
4.	Air transport services (cargo), currently with one aircraft	Countrywide	Aircraft undergoing repair service
5.	Banking and financial management services	Juba	Operational
6.	Hotel and hospitality services	Juba	N/A ³⁷
7.	Civil engineering works, primarily in roads and construction	N/A	N/A
8.	Mining, primarily gold (small-scale)	Gorom, Central Equatoria State	Operational
9.	Stone Crushing Facilities	Central Equatoria State	Operational
10.	Shares in some companies	Juba and countrywide	Dividends to the SSPDF affected. ³⁸

Source: The authors; table drawn based on data presented by MEC and the Military Pension Fund at the 8th Command Council Conference of the SSPDF, December 2022. Used with permission.

³⁷ Status Not Available, or not determined/availed at the time of publication.

³⁸ Due to collapse of the companies or economic decline, or both.

Table 5: A Selection of Planned Economic Investment Initiatives by MEC, SSPDF

S/No	Planned Initiative/Investment Scope	Location	Status
1.	Telecommunications	Countrywide	Plans being finalised
2.	Cement processing factory	N/A	
3.	Sugar processing factory	N/A	
4.	Horizon Commercial Bank building and headquarters	Juba	Under final stages of completion
5.	Sudd Bottling Company	Bor, South Sudan	Finalised; opening soon

Source: The authors; table drawn based on data presented by MEC and the Military Pension Fund at the 8th Command Council Conference of the SSPDF, December 2022.

5.2.1.2 Militating Challenges

There are serious challenges that militate against the successful working of the South Sudan military in national economic growth. The most critical aspect of the challenges is in leadership and management of investment initiatives. Other militating challenges revolve around issues in the mobilisation and management of funds; settlement to contractors of outstanding bills; issues in receiving dividends from companies in which the defence sector made investments; difficulties in the management of equipment and vehicular facilities; lack of spare parts within the market for the type of vehicles acquired and the stone crushing machinery; and loopholes relating to transparency and accountability. These challenges militate against the commendable initiatives by the South Sudan military for participating in reconstruction activities and national economic growth.

5.2.1.3 Prospects for Future Improvement

Despite the militating challenges alluded to above, there appear to be better prospects for the military in engaging in reconstruction activities and contributing to sustainable national economic growth. Political and security stability is of the essence in this context.

It would be prudent to foster the enactment of the Military Economic Corporation Bill; continue to carryout repair and maintenance works on equipment and vehicular facilities; foster the operationalisation of the proposed telecommunications network; consolidate engagement in the mining sector; venture into the oil and gas industry; and participate in the construction of security roads, to help ease not only public transport and connectivity, but also connect food in the farms to consumers throughout the country, and contribute to food security. All these, nonetheless, are

dependent upon leadership and management, on the ability to create and enter into joint ventures, and, for the purposes of emphasis, on political and security stability.

5.2.2 Overview of the Role of the Other Security Agencies in Economic Growth

Apart from the SSPDF, the other security institutions (namely the National Police Service, the National Security Services, the Prisons Services, the Civil Defence Services, and the Wildlife Services) are also actively engaged in several economic activities in the country. Their areas of focus include public transport, farming, air transport, hotel and hospitality, civil engineering works, petroleum and energy, the media, and shareholding.

Operationally, these security institutions suffer from the same militating challenges as those of the SSPDF alluded to earlier. This is fundamentally because these institutions basically sprung out of the SPLA—the precursor to the SSPDF—during the initial process of institutional formation and reformation in the era of the CPA and slightly upon the independence of South Sudan in 2011. Thus, it could be argued that they sprung out with roughly the same mentality, outlook and challenges as those in the parent SSPDF.

Notwithstanding the above, one of them—the National Security Services—seemed to have made more significant strides in the area of investment and contribution to national economic growth than any of its sister agencies, including its parent, the SSPDF. In the decade since independence in 2011, the National Security Services (NSS) has managed to set itself apart from the many organic and inorganic challenges seriously affecting its other sister-agencies, despite being the youngest of the security institutions in the country. It is of particular interest how the NSS has been able to attract and maintain sufficiently competent entrants/recruits to its ranks and files; how it implements the constitutional commitment to, and its positive policy approach towards diversity; and how it epitomised the implementation of an economic model (hereafter, the “NSS Economic Model”) which has made the institution largely self-sufficient.

The outstanding wisdom in which the leadership of the institution managed to attain financial sustainability is a remarkable example that ought to fascinate the other agencies to adopt the NSS Economic Model. At the core of the NSS Economic Model is the quest for and deployment of competence based on merit; the granting of freedom for investment initiatives to operate in accordance with economic principles and market values rather than on pure military norms; the provision of the required management; and an environment of supportive leadership at the top of the institution.

6.0 Recommended Courses of Action on the Way Forward

To alleviate the condition of the population, the following courses of action are recommended on the role of the core security forces in the economic recovery, growth and development of South Sudan:

- (1) The core security forces, including all non-statutory forces, should partake and play a significant role in reversing the trend of untold human suffering that has befallen South Sudan and its people, as a result of disregarding all fundamental commitments under the TCSS (2011).
- (2) Security should not just be about the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and the safety of the government (*i.e.*, state security), but fundamentally about the people and peoples, in equal measure irrespective of their origin, believe and perceived or actual political affiliation.
- (3) Adoption and incorporation of appropriate social development measures—rather than concentrating only on pure military campaigns—as part and defining character of South Sudan’s counterinsurgency strategy; and rethinking the national counterinsurgency narrative in order to ensure a better lasting solution to the recurrent rebellions in the country.

A study by Maciek Mading Mabeny (2023) on the conflict in South Sudan indicates that social development interventions can counter rebellions and yield better peace and development outcomes.³⁹ His findings show that the implementation of counterinsurgency efforts in Maridi State from 2015-2020 highlighted the potential of social development interventions in winning the hearts, minds and support of local populations in promoting stability and economic growth. The valuable insights and lessons for policy-makers from what this paper refers to as the ‘Maridi Counterinsurgency Example,’ which were implemented under Governor Africano Mande Gedima, include:

- (a) Enhancement of coordination and collaboration by fostering greater collaboration and coordination among stakeholders involved in social development interventions; and establishing platforms for information sharing, and joint planning and regular communication to maximize the impact of efforts and minimize duplication.

³⁹ Maciek Mading Mabeny (2023). *Social Development as a Counterinsurgency Measure: Case Study of the Defunct Maridi State, 2015-2020*. Master’s Thesis. Security and Strategic Studies. Institute for Peace, Development and Security Studies, University of Juba.

- (b) Strengthening of community participation by involving local communities in all stages of programme design, implementation and evaluation through participatory approaches (like community consultations and capacity-building initiatives).
 - (c) Fostering of local ownership of social development programs by building the capacity of local institutions and empowering community-based organizations, to enhance sustainability, promote local solutions and ensure long-term impact.
 - (d) Integration of social development with security strategies to address the root causes of insurgency and promote stability.
 - (e) Strengthening of local governance structures and empowerment of local institutions to ensure sustainability of social development interventions.
 - (f) Collaboration and knowledge-sharing among different actors to maximise the impact of social development efforts.
 - (g) Strengthening of monitoring and evaluation processes by developing robust mechanisms to assess the effectiveness and impact of social development programmes, to provide evidence-based insights for program improvement, adaptation, and replication in similar contexts.
 - (h) Exhibiting adaptability and flexibility, consistent with the dynamic nature of local environments.
- (4) Although agriculture is the bedrock and foundational stone of the economy, it is bedevilled by the constant military campaigns for population control by armed opposing forces in the conflict divide. Thus, a rebirth of the national consciousness for economic stability must necessarily hinge itself on, and commence with the urgency to protect, the rural population, as its ability to reengage in farming is not only critical for food security, but also the recovery and sustainable resurgence of the South Sudan economy in both the immediate and long-term aspects of the future.
- (5) To encourage national economic growth and development, the core security forces are urged to ensure sustainable peace by improving civil-military relations, ceasing all hostilities and promoting permanent ceasefire to encourage voluntary repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation and reintegration of IDPs and refugees. The return of IDPs and refugees would allow them to rekindle their livelihoods and productivity, thereby contributing to South Sudan's much needed national economic recovery and growth.

- (6) The security management and oversight bodies are urged to adopt and implement strategic security sector reforms, including making related appointments and re-manning of critical units and departments, to ensure that the core security forces fully shoulder their constitutional mandate, contribute to and participate in South Sudan's economic recovery, and partake of their critical moral role as stewards and guardians of development.
- (7) All efforts must be made to accord the necessary security environment for government, development partners and the private sector to recover and rebuild destroyed physical infrastructure—such as schools, hospitals, shops and places of worship—in order to rekindle/revitalise the livelihoods of the people and contribute to sustainable national economic growth and development.
- (8) To promote sustainable social reforms that guarantee peace and stability, the core security forces are urged to give due consideration to national diversity, gender and regional representation in their recruitment, training, leadership development, and appointments. This will help promote the respect for the fundamental rights and dignity of personnel, and of the diverse communities of South Sudan at large (TCSS, 2011; SPLA Act, 2009; R-ARCSS, 2018).
- (9) Commanders and/or leaders, as well as the personnel of the core security forces in general, are urged to be enlightened on, and thus always seek to respect, the LOAC, which has been established as part of International Law, regulating the use of force, as stipulated in the TCSS (2011), the SPLA Act (2009:8) and the individual legal frameworks of the other security institutions in the country. This will not only contribute to national economic growth, but also help South Sudan comply with its obligations under International Law as a member of the UN. For this reason, it is imperative for the core security forces—and the wider national legal system in general—to place obligations on persons involved in armed violations that have repercussions on South Sudan's economic growth, development, social status and moral stature.
- (10) To ensure better security sector reform outcomes that guarantee sustainable national economic growth, it is urged that deployments and appointments within the core security forces ensure that the right people are assigned to the right jobs.⁴⁰ In addition, it is urged that there be improved coordination⁴¹

⁴⁰ Having or assigning the right people to the right jobs is particularly emphasised by the *SPLA Manual on Job Descriptions of Senior Positions, 2011*.

⁴¹ Coordination, too, is a point critically emphasised by the *SPLA Manual on Job Descriptions of Senior Positions, 2011*.

within internal departments; and between the security agencies, to mutually check on and guarantee commitment to standards that promote ‘the bigger national picture’ and the common good for South Sudan. In the advice of the United Kingdom’s Defence Management College at Cranfield University, improved coordination within internal departments and between security agencies helps in strengthening cohesion. Improved professional coordination provides a sense of direction to and among security agencies, integrates their efforts, and builds and sustains cohesion.⁴² In its argument, coordination prevents each agency from going its own way, and equally checks personnel from going their own way. In turn, the outcome of such an arrangement is the having of the bigger picture in mind in a way that promotes economic growth and development.

- (11) The SSPDF is urged to develop personnel, acquire equipment and establish a unit for MOOTW, for responding to requests by the Government in addressing specified emergencies, participating in reconstruction activities, and assisting in disaster relief, consistent with the constitution and the law.⁴³
- (12) The Government, through the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, is urged to earmark a specific fund to the military for its engagement in personnel welfare activities and income generating programmes.
- (13) The SSPDF and the other security institutions are urged to undertake a revitalisation of all collapsed and existing investment initiatives, including leadership re-alignment and capacitation where necessary, in order to ensure sustainable participation in economic growth. Given its progress over the years, the security institutions are particularly urged to emulate the “Economic Model of the South Sudan National Security Services,” to ensure the growth and sustainability of their investment initiatives and contribute to national development.
- (14) In line with the preceding recommendation, the core security forces are urged to run their investment initiatives or corporations as enterprises based on market principles, rather than as pure military units. They are urged to strengthen the values of transparency and accountability, and strengthen their efforts towards checks-and-balances.
- (15) There should be promotion of diversity based on merit in the management of investment initiatives. Leadership in the enterprises/corporations should

⁴² Trevor Taylor. “The functions of a defence ministry.” In: Laura R. Cleary & Teri McConville (2006): *Managing Defence in a Democracy*. Cass Military Studies. Routledge. Oxon, UK.

⁴³ The participation of the SSPDF in MOOTW is a point of special emphasis in the TCSS (2011), the SPLA Act (2009), the SPLA Rules and Regulations (2008), and the SPLA White Paper on Defence.

encourage participation of employees and the building of a culture teamwork and trust.

- (16) Engaging in partnerships with international investors, particularly in the areas of mining, the hotel and hospitality industry, agriculture, fishing, finance and banking, processing, and infrastructure development.
- (17) Promotion of a culture of goodwill and the common good across all institutions and units of the military/security institutions, characterised by commitment towards human and peoples' rights, and respect for the fundamental freedoms enshrined in South Sudan's constitutional framework.
- (18) Establishment of a military investment authority or body, to offer advice to, monitor and regulate investment initiatives involving the core security forces.
- (19) Comprehensive nation-wide disarmament of civilians, and consolidation of weapons storage and management within the military/security institutions. Implementation of strict measures to control the proliferation of illegal weapons.
- (20) The National Security Services is urged to strengthen and expand its capacities and capabilities for more robust economic and financial intelligence to protect the South Sudan economy from human resource exploitation, counterfeiting, illegal trade, economic exploitation, plunderers, money laundering, and lords of poverty—self-serving individuals and organisations who (Mwesiga Baregu, 2011)⁴⁴ perpetuate poverty and thrive on it through aid or donor support.

7.0 Conclusion

This paper undertook a survey of the contextual security environment in South Sudan; delved into an understanding of the meaning and concept of the security sector and the core security forces, focussed on the legal character, mission and mandate of the core security forces as stipulated in the country's constitutional framework, explored the role of selected foreign militaries in national economic growth, and provided an explanation of the critical link between security and development.

The security environment in South Sudan is characterised by fragile security institutions and continuous armed violence that militate against economic growth.

⁴⁴ Mwesiga Baregu. "Actors, Interests and Strategies in the Great Lakes Conflict Formation." In: Mwesiga Baregu, ed. (2011): *Understanding Obstacles to Peace—Actors, Interests and Strategies in Africa's Great Lakes Region*. International Development Research Centre. Ottawa, Canada.

The endless rebellions since independence have meant continuous campaigns by armed opposing groups to hold and control territory, resulting into the displacement of rural populations and the destruction of agriculture. The paper underscores that to a greater extent most of the campaigns needed further guidance, as they fell short of an effective counter-insurgency strategy. Of greater nuance in this context is the stated ramification on agriculture, which is not only the backbone of South Sudan's rural economy, but also of the country as a whole.

There is a duality of threats in relation to the contemporary South Sudan economy: security threats to the economy on the one hand, and economic threats to security on the other. The economic threats to security have perennially prevented sufficient funding to, and emolument of, the defence and security sector. This duality of threats, compounding with leadership and accountability issues, struggle for political survival, and the continuous wars, have heightened the economic vulnerability of South Sudan and aggravated the agony of the people in immense proportions.

The security sector is critical in democratisation, development, and good governance. It has the capacity to support or undermine democratisation, promote or undermine good governance, and contribute to or derail efforts aimed at sustainable peace, economic growth and development. On the basis of the fact that security issues have been at the core of economic decline and political upheaval, it is imperative that urgent and concrete steps are undertaken to reform the security sector in its entirety. Thus, through this first National Economic Conference, the emphasis for conceptual, policy and programming innovations that create an intersection between development and security in South Sudan's peace and development efforts cannot—and should not—be underestimated. It is the studied opinion of the authors of this paper that sustainable national economic growth and development in South Sudan would only be the outcome of sustainable national security planning, underpinned by the consensus that security is—and therefore ought to be—the backbone of the economy.

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